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JURISDICTION 
This case is before the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to section 78-2-2(3 )(j) of 
the Utah Code Annotated and pursuant to the summary judgment entered as a final judgment 
by the trial court. The appeal was referred to the Utah Court of Appeals under Section 78-2a-
3(2)0). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether the trial court correctly granted summary judgment for an 
employer, Ray's Gardening, and ruled as a matter of law that an employer could not be held 
liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior when an employee was not acting within the 
course or scope of his employment at the time of an automobile accident. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. An appellate court reviews the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment for correctness, affording no special deference to the trial court's legal 
conclusions. Girbich v. Numed. Inc., 977 P.2d 1205 (Utah 1999). The reviewing court 
may affirm a grant of summary judgment on any ground available to the trial court, even 
if it is one not relied upon below. See Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231 (Utah 
1993). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
None. 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
This case arises from an automobile accident which occurred on August 2, 
2001 at the intersection of 12600 South and 2700 West in Riverton, Utah. (R. 2.) Honi 
Thompson and Jaren Nielsen were the drivers of the two vehicle involved in the accident. 
(R. 2.) Ms. Thompson was operating her vehicle westbound on 12600 South and made a 
left turn south onto 2700 West into the path of Mr. Nielsen's vehicle, which was traveling 
east on 12600 South. (R. 2.) 
This appeal arises because, although Mr. Nielsen was on vacation at the time 
of the accident, Ms. Thompson alleges that his mere use of a vehicle owned by Ray's 
Gardening is sufficient to impute liability to Ray's Gardening, Mr. Nielsen's employer. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. 
The Thompsons filed their Complaint against Jaren Nielsen and Ray's 
Gardening on August 29, 2002. (R. 1.) Mr. Nielsen and Ray's Gardening answered the 
complaint and the parties conducted discovery. (R 16-38.) On June 2, 2003, Ray's 
Gardening filed a motion for summary judgment. (R. 39.) The trial court heard oral 
argument on the motion on September 11, 2003. (R. 92 ) The trial court granted Ray's 
Gardening's motion for summary judgment on September 26, 2003. (R. 92.) The 
Thompsons filed their Notice of Appeal on October 21, 2003. (R. 95.) 
2 
C. DISPOSITION OF THE COURT. 
The trial court granted Ray's Gardening's motion to for summary judgment on 
September 26, 2003, and dismissed Ray's Gardening from the case. (R. 92.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Ray's Gardening, L.L.C. ("Ray's Gardening") is a Utah limited liability 
company owned by Golden Ray Holt. (R. 2, 41). Jaren Nielsen is an employee of Ray's 
Gardening and is a grandson of Golden Ray Holt. (R. 41). Jaren Nielsen is employed by 
Ray's Gardening, L.L.C. as the supervisor over the company's landscaping crews. (R. 41-
42). 
As a benefit of employment, Ray's Gardening allows some employees, 
including Jaren Nielsen, to use company vehicles for both business and personal use. (R. 
42). On August 2, 200 L Jaren Nielsen was driving a red 1999 Chevy truck owned by 
Ray's Gardening at the time when a vehicle driven by Plaintiff Honi Thompson turned 
left in front of Nielsen's truck. (R. 2-3). The truck Nielsen was driving at the time of the 
accident did not have any business logo or writing on it. (R. 71). 
Other employees of Ray's Gardening had permission to use the truck, but Jaren 
Nielsen was its primary operator. (R. 42). Nielsen used the truck as his primary vehicle, 
for both business and personal use, while his wife used their personal vehicle primarily 
for her use. (R. 58). 
At the time of the collision. Jaren was driving the truck on his own time for 
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personal use, towing a boat that is owned by Jaren, going with his wife to his mother's 
home, then planning to leave from there to go to Lake Powell for a three-day vacation. 
(R. 42). It is undisputed by the parties that at the time of the collision Jaren was not on 
duty as an employee of Ray's Gardening, nor was he driving the truck for company 
business. (R. 42). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Utah law imposes liability upon employers only when employees commit a tort 
while acting within the scope of their employment. The test for imposing liability on an 
employer for the acts of an employee is set out in Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 
1053 (Utah 1989), which mandates that three requirements be fulfilled before liability 
may be imposed on an employer: 1) the employee's conduct must be the general kind that 
employee is employed to perform; 2) the employee's conduct must occur within the hours 
of employment and within the ordinary spatial boundaries of employment, and 3) the 
employee's conduct must be motivated, at least in part, by the purpose of serving the 
employer's interests. 
The trial court correctly granted summary judgment for Ray's Gardening based on 
the undisputed facts because the Thompsons could not meet any of the three criteria 
required by Birkner. Jaren Nielsen was on vacation at the time of the accident, and was 
not performing the work he was hired by Ray's Gardening to perform. He was off of 
work, towing a boat to the home of his mother when the accident occurred, and was in the 
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course of pursuing his own person interests. Under the undisputed facts, none of the 
Birkner elements apply to this case and Ray's Gardening was properly dismissed on 
summary judgment. Any other result would violate well-established Utah law and would 
result in an unfair application of the law to Ray's Gardening. 
Although the Thompsons attempt to invoke Restatement (Second) of Tort § 317, in 
an attempt to impose liability upon Ray's Gardening, that section does not compel a 
different result. As a preliminary matter, the Thompsons have improperly raised the 
Restatement argument for the first time on appeal, and the Court should decline to 
address the newly raised issue. With regard to the substance of Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 317, that section imposes liability upon an employer only where the employer 
knows or has reason to know that it has the ability to control the employee, and, knows 
that it should exercise control over the employee. The Thompsons failed to provide any 
facts in the summary judgment proceeding, or on appeal, which would support a claim 
that Ray's Gardening knew or should have known that it had an ability to exercise control 
over Jaren Nielsen while he was on vacation, or, that Ray's Gardening should have 
exercised such control over Nielsen. 
In support of their arguments, the Thompsons urge the Court to abandon Utah law 
in favor of purported holdings from other jurisdictions. However, even if the Court was 
inclined to disregard Utah law, the case law cited by the Thompsons does not compel a 
different result. The cases cited by the Thompsons all state rules similar to Utah's rules 
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of law, but the facts of the cases are distinguishable from those in the present case, and 
were decided on very different basis than the present case. Under the rules set out in the 
cases cited by the Thompsons, summary judgment would be required for Ray's 
Gardening. The trial court was correct in deciding to dismiss Ray's Gardening from this 
case, and that judgment should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: UTAH LAW SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION 
TO GRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF RAY'S 
GARDENING ON THE THOMPSONS9 CLAIMS OF 
RESPONDENT SUPERIOR. 
a. Utah law does not hold an employer liable for acts of an 
employee performed solely in the furtherance of the employee's 
interests. 
The Thompsons demand that the Court depart from well-established Utah law 
governing the application of respondeat superior in asking this Court to hold an employer 
liable for the actions of an employee who is undisputedly not acting within the course or 
scope of his employment at the time of an accident. Up to this time, Utah law has 
consistently limited employer liability by holding that u[u]nder the doctrine of respondeat 
superior, employers are vicariously liable for torts committed by employees while acting 
within the scope of their employment." Christensen v. Swenson, 874 P.2d 125. 127 (Utah 
1994). Acts that fall within the scope of employment are specifically defined as '"those 
acts which are so closely connected with what the servant is employed to do, and so fairly 
and reasonably incidental to it, that they may be regarded as methods, even though quite 
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improper ones, of carrying out the objectives of employment.'" IcL (quoting Birkner v. 
Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053, 1056 (Utah 1989) (quoting W. Page Keeton et al., 
Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 70, at 502 (5th ed. 1984))). 
The Thompsons err in claiming that this case presents an issue of first impression 
in Utah. The issue of whether an employer may be held liable for the actions of an 
employee who is not acting within the course or scope of his employment has been settled 
in Utah for more than eighty years. Indeed, this case falls well outside of the situations 
where Utah courts have held that employers may be held liable for the actions of their 
employees. Utah courts have consistently held that an employer may not be held liable 
when his employee is using a company vehicle for purposes that are wholly the 
employee's own. This case fits squarely within the type of case where an employer 
cannot be held liable for the actions of an employee. 
In order to illustrate the settled nature of the law on this issue, it is helpful to 
review Cannon v. Goodvear Tire & Rubber Co.. 208 P. 519 (Utah 1922), one of the first 
reported cases on the issue of respondeat superior in Utah. In Cannon, the plaintiff was 
injured by an automobile driven by an employee of Goodyear. At the time of the 
accident, Goodyear's employee was driving a company vehicle. It was largely undisputed 
that the driver was not acting within the course or scope of his employment at the time of 
the accident, but was pursuing his own personal interests, while using a company truck. 
At the time of the accident, the driver did not have the employer's permission to use the 
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truck to pursue his own personal interests. Based on those facts, the Utah Supreme Court 
affirmed a directed verdict, dismissing the Plaintiffs claims of respondeat superior 
against the employer. 
In its decision, the court made a detailed analysis of the doctrine of respondeat 
superior which is instructive regarding the present case before the Court. The court 
stated: 
As further emphasizing the views of the writer, let us suppose that when 
Kratzer [the driver] made his last delivery for the day at the Short Line 
depot he had immediately returned the truck to the garage in pursuance of 
his employer's instructions. Suppose further that after returning the truck to 
the garage he had later called for it and taken it away and had then done the 
very things he did do, as detailed in the evidence. In such case it could not 
be consistently contended that in returning the truck to the garage he was 
engaged in the business of the defendant or acting within the scope of his 
employment. That such a contention could not be sustained by either 
reason or authority seems to me to be beyond the possibility of rational 
disputation. It would not only be contrary to reason and authority, but 
would also be the rankest kind of injustice and oppression, to hold that 
returning the truck to the garage in the case supposed was a service within 
the scope of Kratzer's employment so as to render his employer responsible 
for his negligence. I see no difference in principle, as far as the proposition 
of law is concerned, between the case supposed and the case disclosed by 
the record. In the one case he wrongfully withheld possession of the truck 
after it should have been returned to the garage; in the other he wrongfully 
took it into his possession. In either case he was both morally and legally 
bound to return it, entirely independent of any duty incident to his 
employment. In the course of this discussion the fact should be continually 
borne in mind that from 1:30 p. m. on the day of the accident until 8:30 a. 
m. on the Monday following Kratzer was complete master of his time and 
was in no sense subject to the defendant's direction or control. Whatever he 
did in such circumstances during said period of time certainly should not be 
attributed to his employer, who had no knowledge of what he was doing nor 
power to direct or control his conduct. 
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R a t 531-32. 
From the time of the decision in Cannon until the present, Utah courts have 
refused to allow an employer to be held liable for actions of their employees when an 
accident or injury arose out of employee's actions which were not intended to benefit the 
employer. The Thompsons seek to overturn nearly a century of well-established law in 
this case. However, the three-part test set out in Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 
1053 (Utah 1989), shows that Ray's Gardening was entitled to summary judgment, and 
that Ray's cannot be held liable to the Thompsons in this case. 
b. The Three-pronged test set out in Birkner v. Salt Lake City, 
shows that Ray's Gardening cannot be held liable for acts of 
Jaren Nielsen at the time of the accident. 
Since the rendering of the decision in Cannon in 1922, Utah's law has remained 
consistent with the principles expressed therein, and the Utah Supreme Court eventually 
formalized a three-prong test in order to determine whether liability should be imposed 
upon employers under the doctrine of respondeat superior} That test is set out in Birkner 
v. Salt Lake County. 771 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1989). 
/. In order to be held liable for the acts of an employee, 
the injuries or damages must have resulted out of the 
conduct that the employee is employed to perform. 
The first element of the Birkner test states that before an employer may be held 
1
 The three criteria of the Birkner test correspond to the first three elements of the 
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 228(1). Clark v. Pangan. 2000 UT 37, ^ 22, fn. 8. 
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liable for the acts of an employee, the employee's conduct must be of the general kind 
the employee is employed to perform. Id (citing Keller v. Gunn Supply Co.. 220 P. 
1063 (Utah 1923)). An employee's acts or conduct must be generally directed toward the 
accomplishment of objectives within the scope of the employee's duties and authority, or 
reasonably incidental thereto. In other words, the employee must be about the employer's 
business and the duties assigned by the employer, as opposed to being wholly involved in 
a personal endeavor. Id (citing, Keller, at 220 P. at 1064.)2 
The trial court correctly ruled that Ray's Gardening could not be held liable for the 
actions of Jaren Nielsen, because the undisputed facts showed that Nielsen was hired to 
supervise one of the company's landscaping crews. (R. 41-42). Had this accident 
occurred while Nielsen was traveling to one of Ray's Gardening's job sites, this would be 
a different case. However, the accident occurred while Nielsen and his wife were on their 
way to a boating vacation at Lake Powell. It cannot be disputed that the accident did not 
occur while Nielsen was performing duties that he was generally hired to perform. 
2
 Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but only if: 
(a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform; 
(b) it occurs substantially within authorized time and space limits; 
(c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master, and 
(d) if force is intentionally used by the servant against another, the use of force 
is not unexpectable by the master. 
Birkner, at 1057, fn. 1. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency § 228 (1958)). 
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2. The employee's conduct must occur within the time 
and spatial limits of his employment. 
The second element in the three-prong Birkner test requires that, as a condition to 
holding an employer liable for the actions of an employee, the employee's conduct must 
occur within the hours of the employee's work and the ordinary spatial boundaries 
of the employment. Id. (citing Cannon v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.. 208 P. 519 (Utah 
1922)); see also, Clark v. Pangan. 2000 UT 37. 
In this case, it is undisputed that the accident occurred while Nielsen was on 
vacation. This case is clear cut on this element, as the accident did not occur within either 
the hours of Nielsen's work or within the ordinary spatial boundaries of Nielsen's work. 
3. An employee's conduct must be partially motivated in 
serving the employer ys interests. 
The third prong in the Birkner test requires a finding that the employee's conduct 
must be motivated, at least in part, by the purpose of serving the employer's interest. 
Id. (citing Stone v. Hurst Lumber Co.. 386 P.2d 910. 911 (Utah 1963)); Combes v. 
Monteomerv Ward & Co.. 228 P.2d 272, 274 (Utah 1951); Cf, Carter v. Bessev. 93 P.2d 
490, 492 (Utah 1939) (employer not liable when employee's conduct intended "for 
purposes other than the master's business"). The Utah Supreme Court in Birkner stated 
that based on the reasoning in Combes v. Montgomery Ward & Co.. 228 P.2d 272, 274 
(Utah 1951) and Carter v. Bessev. 93 P.2d 490 (Utah 1939), a prerequisite to holding an 
employer liable under the theory of respondeat superior, the court must find that an 
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employee's purpose or intent however misguided in its means, must be to further the 
employer's business interests. 
Depositions of Mr. Nielsen and his wife established that, at the time of the 
collision, the use of the vehicle was for personal, not business, use, as they were towing a 
boat from their home to Mr. Nielsen's mother's home just prior to leaving for a personal 
boating vacation at Lake Powell. Nielsen's intent was directed wholly toward 
accomplishing his own personal interests, and had nothing to do with furthering Ray's 
Gardening's interests. 
4. Fundamental notions of fairness require that the Court 
reject the Thompsonsy demand to change the law 
regarding vicarious liability. 
Having failed to satisfy any portion of the well-established Birkner test for 
imputing vicarious liability to Ray's Gardening, the Thompson's ask the Court to 
disregard Utah law and establish a new test. Essentially, they ask the Court to view Mr. 
Nielsen's personal use of a company truck as a benefit to the company, such that any 
accident or injury arising out of the use of the truck, at anv time, could be imputed to the 
company. The problems with the Thompson's position are numerous. First, and 
foremost, the rule they advocate would abrogate well-established law governing employer 
vicarious liability in Utah. Second, the Thompsons' position would result in a slippery 
slope which would eventually end in making employers liable for any act of their 
employees at any time. Finally, the rule violates fundamental notions of fairness. Each of 
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these considerations will be discussed in turn. 
With regard to the first point, the Court must reject the Thompson's position 
because Utah law is settled under the Birkner three-prong test discussed above. That rule 
was established by the Utah Supreme Court, to which this Court must give deference. 
The three-part test established by Birkner has stood for the last fifteen years since its 
issuance and is based on nearly a century of well-defined law in Utah. The Thompsons 
have not shown any legitimate reason which would compel the Court to abandon the test, 
nor have they given the Court any reasonable alternative to the Birkner test. The 
Thompsons have given this Court no reason to reject well-established Utah law in favor 
of their position. 
Second, if the Court allows the Thompsons to impute liability upon Ray's 
Gardening merely because an employee received a vehicle as an employment benefit, 
then, any employer who gave an employee a car or even a car allowance as an 
employment benefit would be liable for any act of that employee any time the car was 
used, on or off the job. Following that reasoning to its logical conclusion, it follows that 
employers who pay their employees sufficient wages to allow the employees to purchase 
a vehicle could be viewed as receiving a benefit from the employees' purchase and use of 
such vehicles, and under the Thompson's reasoning, the employers should be held 
vicariously liable for any use of those vehicles. The logical conclusion, under the 
Thompson's reasoning, would result in virtually no limit to the liability of an employer 
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for any accident of an employee's use of a vehicle owned by the employee. 
Additionally, if the Court were to accept the Thompsons' position, the result would 
be disastrous to employers in Utah. Taken to the extreme, but nevertheless following the 
Thompson's reasoning, every employer would be held liable for any tortious act of an 
employee at all times because employees spend their wages for non-employment 
activities, and the private activities of the employee arguably benefit an employer. 
Therefore, any act performed by an employee at any time could, under the Thompsons' 
reasoning, be attributed to the employer's payment of wages to the employee, which 
allow him to pay his bills. As absurd as this scenario sounds, it is the ultimate conclusion 
of the Thompson's reasoning. This Court cannot allow Utah jurisprudence to start down 
such a slippery slope. Clearly, the well-defined limits on employer liability established in 
Birkner were instituted in keeping with notions of fairness and logical limits, and those 
considerations should not be abandoned in this case. 
The Thompsons' position is fundamentally unfair because, although the 
Thompsons have argued that vicarious liability exists to allow those in a better position to 
compensate injured persons for their damages, they have failed to show, both during the 
summary judgment phase, and again on appeal, that there is any justification for holding 
an employer liable for the actions of an employee when, at the time of the accident, Ray's 
did not direct or control the employee's actions, nor did Ray's Gardening actually derive 
some business benefit from Mr. Nielsen's personal use of a vehicle. 
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The Thompson's have also failed to show how the absence of Ray's Gardening 
from the case would result in their being under-compensated for their alleged damages. 
The Thompsons attempt to make much of their argument that lawsuits against employees 
are often suits against individuals with "no or little resources." (Appellant's Brief at 6.) 
However, the Thompsons recognize and have argued that there is insurance coverage on 
the truck driven by Mr. Nielsen, and there is no allegation that Mr. Nielsen is 
underinsured.3 Therefore, there is no compelling reason why Ray's Gardening should be 
required to remain in the case solely to fully compensate the Thompsons. It would be, in 
the words of Justice Thurman, in Cannon, the "rankest kind of injustice and oppression," 
id. at 532, to compel Ray's Gardening to remain in this case when it had no knowledge of 
what Mr. Nielsen was doing nor power to direct or control his conduct at the time of the 
accident. 
3
 The Thompsons argue that assuming that Ray's Gardening provided insurance for 
the vehicle, the provision of insurance shows control by Ray's Gardening over the 
vehicle. However, Ahlstrom v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2003 UT 4, ^ 8, is instructive in 
showing that "some control" by an employer over an employee's use of a vehicle is not 
sufficient to establish liability under respondeat superior. Rather, cases addressing the 
control issue with respect to agency relationships, suggest that the test is whether the 
employer controlled the details of the work. See, Kunz v. Beneficial Temporaries, 921 
P.2d 456 (Utah 1996). In fact, the basis for the going and coming rule is centered in the 
policy that is it unfair to hold an employer liable for torts committed by an employee 
when he is off of work and is not under the control of the employer. See, Whitehead v. 
Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 801 P.2d 934, 937 (Utah 1989). 
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c. Case law from other jurisdictions cited by the Thompsons does 
not support holding Ray's Gardening liable in this case. 
The Thompsons cite to various authorities, all outside of the State of Utah, for 
their proposition that an employee's receipt of a vehicle as an employment benefit should 
result in imputing vicarious liability to the employer. However, even the cases cited by 
the Thompsons do not support their theory. For example, in Lazar v. Thermal Equip. 
Corp., 158 Cal. App.3d 458 (1983), the court predicated its ruling on a branch of the 
"coming and going rule" which is not at issue in this case. 
The facts in Lazar are as follows: an employee of Thermal Equipment 
("Company") finished work and drove a company truck to a store in order to purchase an 
item. The store was located in a direction away from both the Company's plant and the 
employee's home. The employee testified that he planned on purchasing the item and 
then going home. Before reaching the store, the employee struck the plaintiffs vehicle 
and injured the plaintiff. 
The employee was employed as a project engineer, and was given a company 
vehicle to take home on a daily bases because he was constantly on call as a trouble-
shooter for the Company. Customers of the Company would call the employee at his 
home, after hours, and on the weekends. In order to respond to those calls, the employee 
required the Company's truck in which he carried his tools. 
The case went to trial where the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, and 
awarded the plaintiff damages. At the conclusion of the trial, the court refused to instruct 
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the jury that the employee was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of 
the accident. The jury specifically found that the employee was not acting within the 
scope of his employment at the time of the accident. The verdict was reduced to the 
statutory limit under California's "permissive use" statute,4 and Plaintiff filed a motion 
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict claiming that the jury should have been 
instructed that the employee was acting within the scope of his employment and the 
verdict should not have been reduced. The trial court accepted the plaintiffs argument 
and entered judgment against the Company in the amount originally awarded by the jury. 
The Company appealed claiming that it was error to conclude as a matter of law 
that the employee was acting within the scope of his employment. On appeal, the court 
articulated the general rule governing respondeat superior in California: "an employer is 
responsible for the torts of his employee if these torts are committed within the scope of 
employment." Lazar, 148 Cal. App. at 462 (citations omitted). However, the court also 
recognized that the going and coming rule "acts to limit an employer's liability under 
respondeat superior." Id The court stated the going and coming rule as follows: "[t]his 
rule deems an employee's actions to be outside of the scope of employment when these 
actions occur while the employee is going to or returning from work." Id. However, the 
court also recognized an exception to the going and coming rule when the employee's trip 
to or from work bestowed an "incidental benefit to the employer, not common to 
4
 The verdict was reduced from $81,000 to $15,000. 
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commute trips made by ordinary members of the work force." Id. 
The court concluded that the employee's position as a troubleshooter, and use of 
the company's vehicle during off hours and weekends conferred a special benefit upon 
the Company. Specifically, the object of the employee's trip home was to transport the 
vehicle to the employee's home where it would be available for the employee's 
troubleshooting duties for the Company. The Company derived a special benefit from 
having an around-the-clock trouble shooter on call to service the Company's customers. 
Unlike, Lazar, this case does not present a situation where Nielsen's use of the 
truck imparted an special benefit upon Ray's Gardening. The truck was not going to be 
used by Nielsen at any time during his vacation for the furtherance of Ray's Gardening's 
interests or in pursuit of Ray's Gardening's business. Therefore, even under the 
reasoning expressed in Lazar, Ray's Gardening should not be held liable for the actions of 
Jaren Nielsen. 
As an additional consideration, Lazar expressed the "modem" justification for the 
doctrine of respondeat superior, a review of which may be helpful in the present case: 
Although earlier authorities sought to justify the respondeat superior 
doctrine on such theories as 'control' by the master of the servant, the 
master's 'privilege' in being permitted to employ another, the third party's 
innocence in comparison to the master's selection of the servant, or the 
master's 'deep pocket' to pay for the loss, 'the modem justification for 
vicarious liability is a rule of policy, a deliberate allocation of a risk. The 
losses caused by the torts of employees, which as a practical matter are sure 
to occur in the conduct of the employer's enterprise, are placed upon that 
enterprise itself, as a required cost of doing business. They are placed upon 
the employer because, having engaged in an enterprise which will, on the 
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basis of past experience, involve harm to others through the torts of 
employees, and sought to profit by it, it is just that he, rather than the 
innocent injured plaintiff, should bear them; and because he is better able to 
absorb them, and to distribute them, through prices, rates or liability 
insurance, to the public, and so to shift them to society, to the community at 
large, (citations omitted) Similarly, Harper and James stated the focus of 
the doctrine thus: '"We are not here looking for the master's fault but rather 
for risks that may fairly be regarded as typical of or broadly incidental to the 
enterprise he has undertaken. . . . Further, we are not looking for that which 
can and should reasonably be avoided, but with the more or less inevitable 
toll of a lawful enterprise.'" (citations omitted) Categorization of an 
employee's action as within or outside the scope of employment thus begins 
with a question of foreseeability, i.e., whether the accident is part of the 
inevitable toll of a lawful enterprise. 
Id at 463-64 (quoting 2 Harper and James, THE LAW OF TORTS (1956) pp. 1376-1377.) 
The Lazar court reasoned that foreseeability could be defined by distinguishing 
between minor "deviations" and substantial "departures" from the employer's business, 
concluding that the former are foreseeable and the latter are unforeseeable and take the 
employee out of the scope of his employment. Id at 465. The Lazar court determined 
that the employee's intended visit to the store was a foreseeable and minor deviation and 
the evidence showed that it occurred with his employer's permission. Therefore, the 
court concluded that the doctrine of respondeat superior should apply to Thermal. 
This rather lengthy examination of Lazar shows the fallacy of the Thompsons' 
position in the case at bar. First, Lazar was decided under distinguishable facts which 
result in application of different rules of law. Obviously, the going is coming rule is 
inapplicable to the case at bar. However, if the rules governing Lazar had to be applied to 
this case, Ray's Gardening would still be entitled to summary judgment, because Jaren 
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Nielsen was traveling to Lake Powell, while on vacation, at the time of the accident. This 
was a substantial departure from his normal work duties and not the type of "minor 
deviation" which renders respondeat superior applicable. Mr. Nielsen's acts cannot, by 
any stretch of the imagination, be considered to have been performed "in the conduct of 
the employer's enterprise" and therefore, respondeat superior is inapplicable in this case. 
Similarly, Whalen v. Hill 219 So.2d 727 (Fla. App. 1969), cited by the 
Thompsons, is also inapplicable to the present case before the Court. That case was not 
decided under the doctrine of respondeat superior, nor was respondeat superior 
discussed in the court's opinion. Rather, the court applied the "dangerous instrumentality 
doctrine" which, in Florida in 1969, indicated that: "[w]hen an owner authorizes and 
permits his automobile to be used by another he is liable for the injuries to third parties 
caused by the negligent operation so authorized by the owner." Id at 729. 
Wilcox v. Wunderlich, 272 P. 207 (Utah 1928) is the sole Utah case discovered 
addressing the "dangerous instrumentality doctrine" and its application to automobiles in 
Utah. That case readily shows the inapplicability of the dangerous instrumentality 
doctrine to this case, as it provides as follows: 
. . . there is another rule of liability, independent of the doctrine of 
respondeat superior, which arises when one knowingly intrusts an 
automobile to another, though not his agent or servant, who is so 
incompetent as to the handling of the same as to convert it into a dangerous 
instrumentality, in which case liability rests upon the combined negligence 
of the person so intrusting the machine to the incompetent driver and of the 
driver in its operation. In Berry on Automobiles (5th Ed.) § 1197, P. 884, 
the rule is thus stated: 
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Aside from the relation of master and servant, the owner of an 
automobile may be rendered liable for injuries inflicted by its 
operation by one whom he has permitted to drive the same, on 
the ground that such person, by reason of his want of age or 
experience, or his physical or mental condition, or his known 
habit of recklessness, is incompetent to safely operate the 
machine. An automobile is a machine that is capable of doing 
great damage, if not carefully handled, and for this reason the 
owner must use care in allowing others to assume control over 
it. If he intrusts it to a child of such tender years that the 
probable consequence is that he will injure others in the 
operation of the car, or if the person permitted to operate the 
car is known to be incompetent and incapable of properly 
running it, although not a child, the owner will be held 
accountable for the damage done, because his negligence in 
intrusting the car to an incompetent person is deemed to be 
the proximate cause of the damage. In such a case of mere 
permissive use, the liability of the owner would rest, not alone 
upon the fact of ownership, but upon the combined 
negligence of the owner and the driver; negligence of the 
owner in intrusting the machine to an incompetent driver, and 
of the driver in its operation." 
Wilcox, at 220. 
In this case, the Thompsons have put forth no evidence that Jaren Nielsen was 
incompetent, by reason of physical or mental condition, or known habit or recklessness, to 
operate his vehicle at the time of the accident. In the summary judgment procedure, the 
party opposing the motion has the burden of producing "specific facts showing that there 
is a genuine issue for trial. If does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, 
shall be entered against him." U.R.C.P. 56(e). The Thompsons produced no evidence 
showing that Jaren Nielsen was not competent to operate his vehicle, and therefore, they 
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cannot now be heard to argue that the dangerous instrumentality doctrine is applicable in 
this case. 
d. Utah case law controls this case and shows that Ray's Gardening 
cannot be held liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior. 
Existing Utah law controls this case. In addition to the rules of law set out in 
Birkner and discussed above, the Utah Supreme Court has relied on the going and 
coming rule to bar employer liability where an employee was not traveling to or from 
work but was driving for separate personal use. Lane v. Messer. 731 P.2d 488 (Utah 
1986)(fmding the employer not liable where employee had continuous custody of a 
company van to enable him to respond to service calls after hours but where the employee 
was not on a service call at the time of the accident). 
The only exception to the coming and going rule that has been recognized in Utah 
is the dual purpose exception, which the Utah Supreme Court has restricted to situations 
where the business purpose is the predominant purpose for the employee's actions. In 
Whitehead, the Court explained that, even where an employer benefits from an 
employee's conduct, '"if the predominant motivation and purpose of the activity is in 
serving the social aspect, or other personal diversion of the employee, even though there 
may be some transaction of business or performance of duty merely incidental or 
adjunctive thereto, the person should not be deemed to be in the course of his 
employment.'" Whitehead, 801 P.2d at 937 (quoting Martinson v. W-M Insurance 
Agency, Inc.. 606 P.2d 256, 258 (Utah 1980)). 
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A further examination of Whitehead may prove instructive in resolving the issues 
raised in this appeal. In Whitehead, the defendant was employed as a salesman and, at the 
time of the accident, was driving from the office with a dual purpose of making sales calls 
from home and retiring for the evening. The Court found that despite the plaintiffs 
intention to perform some work-related tasks, the dual purpose exception did not apply 
because the predominant purpose of the travel was not for business. Therefore, the 
defendant's employer could not be held liable for damages from the employee's accident. 
The Court applied the going and coming rule in a similar way in Ahlstrom v. Salt 
Lake City Corp., 2003 UT 4 ^ 14 (rehearing denied 2003), holding that employer liability 
was not appropriate under the dual purpose exception where a police officer was driving a 
patrol car home from a work-related meeting despite the fact that the employer exercised 
control over the vehicle and benefitted from the employee driving the vehicle? The 
Court explained that where "an employee engages in conduct benefitting the employer or 
which is controlled by the employer, we weigh the benefit and control against the 
personal nature of the trip in order to determine where it is appropriate to place liability." 
Ahlstrom at J^ 9. However, the Court explained that "a mere benefit to the [employer] or 
the [employer's] exercise of some control over the use of the vehicle, is not enough to 
5The employer in Alhstrom exercised control over the vehicle by requiring the employee 
to keep certain items in the car, requiring her to wear appropriate attire while driving it, and 
requiring her to monitor the radio and be ready to respond to calls while she was driving. The 
employer benefitted from the officer's use of the vehicle by having another officer on call 
while she was driving. 
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overcome the general premises of the coming and going rule.11 Id. at | 8 (emphasis 
added). 
In the present case, the Thompsons' claim of employer liability fails because Jaren 
Nielsen did not have a dual purpose of serving his employer while he towed his boat from 
his house to his parents' house en route to Lake Powell for a three-day vacation. The 
undisputed facts showed that his purpose in driving the vehicle was entirely personal. He 
was not on any errand for his employer. He was off duty, and he was not on call. He was 
not subject to any control by his employer, nor was he traveling to or from work. 
Comparing the present case to Ahlstromu the present case presents an even more 
clear cut case of failure of the necessary conditions required to impute liability to an 
employer. If, as in Ahlstromu a police officer driving home from a work-related meeting, 
in a marked patrol car, in uniform, on call to respond to emergencies, did not qualify for 
the dual purpose exception, certainly Jaren Nielsen's personal use of his employer's truck 
to tow his boat from his home to visit family and go on vacation would also not qualify 
for the exception. Similarly, if a salesman driving home with plans to do some work from 
home did not meet the dual purpose exception (as in Whitehead), Jaren Nielsen's trip 
from home to vacation would not qualify for exception. 
Contrary to the assertions of the Thompsons, the weighing of considerations 
discussed in Ahlstrom does not mandate a finding that Ray's Gardening be found liable 
under the doctrine of respondeat superior. On the contrary, such a weighing of 
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considerations actually supports the trial court's conclusion that summary judgment was 
appropriate for Ray's Gardening. In Ahlstrom, the court articulated the weighing 
standard as follows: 
This does not mean that if the employer derives any benefit or exercises any 
control over the conduct it will be liable. Rather, where an employee 
engages in conduct benefitting the employer or which is controlled by 
the employer, we weigh the benefit and control against the personal 
nature of the trip in order to determine where it is appropriate to place 
liability. 
Id. at Tf 9 (emphasis added). There is no evidence before the Court, just as there was no 
evidence before the trial court, that Jaren Nielsen's use of the truck at the time of the 
accident actually benefitted Ray's Gardening. Jaren Nielsen was not performing work for 
the company; he was not required to use the truck at the time of the accident; Ray's 
Gardening did not require him to make the trip which resulted in the accident; the use of 
the truck outside of work did not provide any advertising or marketing advantages to 
Ray's Gardening, and; Ray's did not exercise any control over Nielsen at the time of the 
accident. In short, there is no justifiable reason for imposing vicarious liability upon 
Ray's Gardening for the accident. 
If, as argued by the Thompson's, the provision of the truck was actually part of 
Nielsen's compensation, that should be deemed to be a liability, not a benefit to the 
company, because it required the company to bear an additional expense that it might not 
otherwise have to bear. It is pure speculation by the Thompsons to assume that Jaren 
Nielsen would not have remained at his employment had the company not provided him a 
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vehicle. This trial court did not base its decision upon such speculative assumptions, nor 
should this Court in deciding this appeal. 
Utah Court have been clear in holding that, as a general rule, ownership of a motor 
vehicle does not alone subject the owner to liability for the negligence of permissive 
users. Lane v. Messer, 731 P.2d 488, 491 (Utah 1986)(citing 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles 
§ 428). The legislature has made an exception to that general rule in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-2-22, which provides that every owner of a motor vehicle causing or knowingly 
permitting a minor under the age of eighteen years to drive it and any person who gives or 
furnishes a motor vehicle to such a minor shall be jointly and severally liable with the 
minor for any damage caused by the minor's negligence. Other exceptions have been 
carved out by case law. Lane, at 491. Those exceptions may be summarized generally as 
instances, not applicable in the present case, in which the vehicle owner negligently 
entrusts the vehicle to a driver that he knows or in the exercise of reasonable care should 
have known to be an incompetent, careless, reckless, or inexperienced driver or an 
intoxicated driver. Lane, at 491. (citing, 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 431(l)-(2). 
Liability has also been found where the owner knows or by the exercise of reasonable 
care should have known of the defective and unsafe condition of the vehicle. IdL (citing 
Id. at § 430.) 
In order to support their failed claim against Ray's Gardening, the Thompsons 
attempt to blur the concepts of benefit and motivation. Under the analysis set forth by the 
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Utah Supreme Court, liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior is not centered 
on the employer's motivation for providing an employment benefit, the employee's 
motivation for continuing his employment, or the benefit the employer receives from 
keeping the employee. Rather, the issue hinges solely upon the employee's purpose for 
using the truck at the time of the accident, and whether the employee's purpose for using 
the truck at that time was a benefit to the employer. Jaren Nielsen's sole purpose for 
using the truck at the time of the accident was personal and because Ray's Gardening 
received no benefit from Jaren Nielsen's use of its truck at the time of the accident, it 
cannot be held liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Therefore, the ruling of 
the trial court granting Ray's Gardening summary judgment should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 IS NOT 
APPLICABLE TO CREATE LIABILITY ON RAY'S GARDENING. 
a. The Thompson Raise the Issue of Liability Under Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 317 For the First Time on Appeal. 
The Court should decline to address the Thompson's argument based around 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 317, because it was not argued to the trial court below. 
Espinal v. Salt Lake City Bd. of Educ. 797 P.2d 412, 413 (Utah 1990)("With limited 
exceptions, the practice of this court has been to decline consideration of issues raised for 
the first time on appeal."). The trial court never considered the arguments, and they are 
improperly raised now on appeal. 
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b. Ray's Gardening May Not be Held Liable Under the 
Undisputed Facts of this Case under the Terms of Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 317. 
The Thompsons fail to present sufficient analysis to show that Ray's Gardening 
should be held liable for the acts of Jaren Nielsen under the terms of Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 317. Had an analysis been provided, it would have been readily 
apparent that Section 317 does not apply to this case. Section 317 provides as follows: 
A master is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control his 
servant while acting outside the scope of his employment as to prevent him 
from intentionally harming others or from so conducting himself as to 
create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, if 
(a) the servant 
(I) is upon the premises in possession of the master or upon which the 
servant is privileged to enter only as his servant, or 
(ii) is using a chattel of the master, and 
(b) the master 
(I) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control his 
servant, and 
(ii) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising 
such control. 
This Restatement section is inapplicable because the Thompsons completely failed 
to show any facts which would support a claim that Ray's Gardening 1) knew or should 
have known that they had the ability to control Jaren Nielsen, while he was on his 
vacation and acting solely in furtherance of his own personal interests, or that 2) Ray's 
Gardening knew or should have known that there was a necessity and opportunity to 
exercise control over Jaren while he was on vacation. It is clearly insufficient, under the 
express terms of the Restatement section, to impose liability upon Ray's Gardening, 
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merely because Jaren Nielsen was driving a truck owned by Ray's. The Thompson's 
have the burden of showing the additional elements and have failed to meet their burden. 
Jackson v. Richter, 891 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1995) also makes it clear that liability 
under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 317 is based upon the foreseeability of the 
employee's actions. Id at 1392. (uIn the context of a claim for negligent supervision or 
retention, a duty may arise when an employer could reasonably be expected, consistent 
with the practical realities of an employer-employee relationship, to appreciate the threat 
to a plaintiff of its employee's actions and to act to minimize or protect against that 
threat.") In this case, nothing the Thompsons alleged, or set forth on appeal, shows that 
Ray's Gardening reasonably expected to foresee an unreasonable threat of Jaren Nielsen's 
use of the truck. Therefore, a direct claim against Ray's based upon Section 317 should 
fail as a matter of law. 
POINT III 
CASE LAW FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS SHOWS THAT 
MERELY PROVIDING AN EMPLOYEE A VEHICLE, AS A 
BENEFIT, IS INSUFFICIENT TO IMPUTE LIABILITY TO THE 
EMPLOYER. 
This case should be decided based solely upon existing Utah law governing the 
doctrine of respondeat superior, as set out above in Point I. However, the Thompsons 
have cited to case law from other jurisdiction which allegedly holds that provision of a 
company vehicle to an employee is sufficient to impute liability to the employer. The 
Thompsons rely mainly on Pfender v. Torres, 765 A.2d 208 (N.J. Super. 2001), in 
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concluding erroneously that liability should be imposed on Ray's Gardening. However, 
they fail to cite the general rule in New Jersey, as stated in Pfender, which is: 
Liability for the employer is only appropriate if the vehicle is being used by 
the employee "for the purpose of advancing the employer's business or 
interests, as distinguished from the private affairs of the employee." 
Id at 217. Significantly, the Thompsons also fail to mention that resolution of the issue 
of respondeat superior in Pfender turned on the rule that allowed an employer to be held 
liable for the actions of an employee "where an employer requires the employee to drive 
his or her vehicle to work so that the vehicle is available for use in fulfilling the 
employee's work-related responsibilities." Id (citing Oaks v. Connors, 660 A.2d 423, 
426-27 (1995))(emphasis added.). Thus, the employer's liability under that "well-
recognized exception" was clear since the employee was "driving to work when the 
accident happened" and "he was required to use the car in the performance of his 
employment as a demonstrator to encourage sales and to run work-related errands." Id. 
Clearly, the rules set out in Pfender are inapplicable to the case at bar. Jaren 
Nielsen was not driving his car to work and was not using the vehicle to fulfill his work-
related responsibilities. He was not "required" to drive the truck at the time of the 
accident. Moreover, unlike the employee in Pfender, whose mere use of the car provided 
"advertising and promotional" benefits to his employer, Mr. Nielsen did not provide a 
benefit to Ray's Gardening just by driving the truck during his vacation time because the 
truck bore no markings of any kind advertising Ray's Gardening's business. 
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Similarly, Easterlin v. Green, 150 S.E.2d 473 (S.C. 1966), does not support the 
Thompson's case. The Thompson's analysis of Easterlin failed to mention that the 
defendant therein was the sole employee of a used car dealer, and, at the time of the 
accident had borrowed a vehicle belonging to the employer, with the intent of using the 
car to "prospect" during the nighttime in order to make sales for the employer. It was 
while the employee was prospecting in order to make sales for his employer when the 
accident occurred. During the evening when the employee had the vehicle, he had called 
on two prospective purchasers of the vehicle before the accident occurred. Based on 
those facts, the court found that an important part of the employee's employment 
consisted of nighttime prospecting, and that the employer derived substantial benefit from 
the employee's use of its vehicle at the time of the accident. 
Unlike each of the cases cited by the Thompsons, this case does not involve a 
situation where the employee's purpose for using the vehicle had a direct and concrete 
connection with the reasons for his employment. Jaren Nielsen's use of the vehicle was 
wholly unrelated to his employment at the time of the accident, and therefore, Ray's 
Gardening cannot be held vicariously liable in this action. This case not only does not fall 
"between the poles" of imputing vicarious liability upon an employer, it is not even close. 
Ray's Gardening cannot be held liable pursuant to any of the cases cited by the 
Thompsons, and it has been unable to locate one case supporting a theory of imputing 
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liability based solely on the fact that the car is owned by the employer at the time of the 
accident. 
Unfortunately for the Thompsons, Utah law as well as case law from other 
jurisdictions, fails to support their claims against Ray's Gardening. It is significant that 
no precedential support can be found for the unfair and unlimited liability advocated by 
the Thompsons in this case. Courts in virtually every jurisdiction of the United States, 
and more importantly, here in Utah, require a logical and equitable basis for imputing 
liability to an employer. That basis has been formulated into the three-part test set out in 
Birkner, which has been discussed in length above. The Thompsons have failed to meet 
any of the elements of the Birkner test, and therefore, their claims fail as a matter of law. 
The decision of the trial court, in granting summary judgment for Ray's Gardening was 
correct and should be affirmed on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The question of whether an employer may be held liable for the actions of an 
employee who was not acting within the course or scope of his employment at the time of 
an automobile accident is well-settled in Utah. There is no basis for imputing liability to 
Ray's Gardening solely based on the fact that Ray's owned the vehicle involved in the 
accident. Each of the Utah cases cited by Ray's Gardening supports a finding that the 
trial court correctly granted summary judgment for Ray's. In addition, when analyzed 
thoroughly, even the cases cited by the Thompsons support Ray's Gardening's position as 
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well. In fact, Ray's has been unable to locate a single case, from any jurisdiction, that 
substantially supports the Thompsons' position. 
The Thompsons' position is fundamentally unfair, and subverts the rules of law 
that have been established in Utah for well over eighty years. Moreover, the Thompsons' 
position would ultimately result in unlimited liability on the part of an employer, where 
previously, Utah courts have been very careful to impose liability under certain well-
defined circumstances. Therefore, the Court should affirm the judgment of the trial court, 
and award Ray's its costs incurred in defending this appeal. 
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